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FAIRNESS AND WELFARE FROM A COMPARATIVE LAW
PERSPECTIVE
HORACIO SPECTOR*

In the Middle Ages, civilian legal scholarship started to develop a
theoretical structure capable of explaining and systematizing the
whole gamut of Roman Law norms. This process culminated during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with the drafting of European and Latin American civil codes. After civilian codification was
in practice, completed with the enactment of the German Civil Code
(BGB), legal science started to decline in intellectual vitality. Though
jurists are still engaged in the systematization of codified rules, and, in
particular, of judicial decisions that seek to adjust the code to new
economic, social, and technological circumstances, this activity lacks
the theoretical sophistication that marked pre-codification civilian
studies. In great part, this is due to the fact that civilian jurists have
completed, for all practical purposes, the process of rediscovery and
systematization of Roman Law that laid the bases for codification.
In the last decades, North American legal scholars have produced an intellectual revolution in bringing to bear economics and
moral philosophy upon the study of particular legal institutions. Economic lawyers and legal philosophers compete with each other in
trying to provide the most successful explanation of different fields of
common law.' The resulting paradigms have enriched legal scholarship in an unprecedented way. In this Article, I will try to determine
whether, and, if so, to what extent, those theoretical studies can be
helpful to explain private law as established in civil law jurisdictions.
My aim is both intellectual and practical. Intellectually, I am concerned with the relative importance of fairness and efficiency in civil
* Professor of Law, Dean of the School of Law, and Vice Rector, Universidad Torcuato
Di Tella. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Special Workshop on Law and
Economics and Legal Scholarship, 21st IVR World Congress, Lund, Sweden (August 12-18,
2003). A related paper (forthcoming in the LouisianaLaw Review) was delivered as the Tucker
Lecture at the Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, March 20, 2003. I gratefully acknowledge the very helpful comments made by Marcelo Ferrante, Guido Pincione,
Fernando Teson, and the audiences in those meetings.
1. For a recent example of the controversy, defending the economic viewpoint, see Louis
KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002).
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law. Practically, I am interested in redirecting the focus of civilian
scholarship to the economic and philosophic foundations of law. Philosophical studies could also serve to restore the intellectual continuity between moral philosophy and civilian legal scholarship that was
apparent until codification.
I.

ECONOMICS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN COMMON LAW
SCHOLARSHIP

The idea that legal scholarship is a science accompanied the birth
of American legal scholarship. As Dean Anthony Kronman says,
Langdell defended the Hobbesian understanding of law and politics
as a kind of geometry whose foundational principles could be discovered by natural reason.2 In contrast to the classical conception of
common law as a realm of practical wisdom and experience, Langdell
embraced the basic tenets of legal formalists such as Bentham and
Austin, who thought that law could be reconstructed as a rational
order. Instead of favoring a reconstruction from without, in the form
of civil codes, Langdell maintained that law professors could reconstruct common law decisions from within to reach a "geometrical"
system of legal principles.
Despite the Langdellian conception of common law scholarship
as a formal science, American legal scholarship is not usually called a
science. The reason possibly resides in the fact that, unlike civilian
scholarship, it did not achieve a high degree of abstract systematization. It is only in the last decades, with the emergence of law and economics, that American legal scholarship is reaching a high degree of
theorization and analytical complexity.3
It is worth noting the intellectual milieu in which law and economics arose. In the early sixties, Anglo-American moral and political philosophy was still under the sway of utilitarianism, which had
gained a preeminent position during the nineteenth century through
the work of followers of Jeremy Bentham, such as John Austin,
James Mill, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sigdwick. During the twentieth century, utilitarianism became dominant in American moral philosophy and exerted an influence on metaphysics and epistemology
2. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 170-85 (1993).
3. This has animated Professor Ulen to claim that legal scholarship is transforming itself
into a new science. See Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical
Work, and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, U. ILL. L. REV. 875 (2002).

2004]

FAIRNESS AND WELFARE

through pragmatism. At the same time, realism and instrumentalism
were the main intellectual forces in legal theory. Born as a reaction
against Langdellian formalism, instrumentalism was reinvigorated by
the legal revolution that started after Lochner v. New York. The instrumentalist conception of law prepared the terrain for the foray of
economists into legal doctrine.
The works of Ronald Coase and Guido Calabresi gave rise to the
emergence of a whole new approach to law, popularized in American
law schools by Richard Posner. The economic approach to law revolves around the idea of efficiency or aggregate welfare. It basically
maintains that legal rules can be explained as institutional attempts to
maximize aggregate welfare. In American legal culture, the idea that
legal rules are instruments for pursuing different social ends was very
entrenched in the anti-formalist, realist movement. The novelty of
law and economics is that it provides a unified analytical model to
explain a vast array of seemingly unconnected legal rules. The fundamental premise of this model is that people are rational agents who
choose their actions so as to maximize their individual utilities on the
basis of a consistent order of transitive preferences.4 The model also
assumes that there is an intelligible and coherent notion of efficiency
or welfare in terms of which legal institutions can be assessed. The
economic paradigm of law shares with utilitarianism the proposition
that law may allocate benefits and burdens across different individuals so as to maximize general welfare.
Let me illustrate the economic explanation of law with two examples. My first example comes from tort law. In common law, negligence is traditionally understood in terms of the care that a
reasonable person would take under the given circumstances. Notably, it was a judge who proposed a reinterpretation of negligence in
terms of costs and benefits. Judge Learned Hand formulated, in
United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,' the famous rule that an agent is
negligent when the burden of precautions needed to prevent an injury
is less than the gravity of the injury times the probability that the in-

4. In the last years, economists had to cope with the finding of behavioral anomalies that
beset the assumptions of rational choice theory. Law and economics scholars have begun to
weaken those assumptions to account for different legal rules. In the text, I follow the classic
exposition of law and economics as based on the Homo economicus postulate, because recent
variations on the paradigm do not alter the propositions I defend. For a survey of the new
literature, see, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
5. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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jury will occur. Generalizing Hand's suggestion, law and economics
defines negligence as want of efficient care, and maintains that the
goal of tort law is to maximize efficiency in social areas where voluntary transactions cannot yield efficiency because of transactions costs.
I will take my second example from contract law. A body of literature has focused on the relative efficiency of such legal remedies
for breach of contract as expectation damages and specific performance. According to mainstream law and economics, one end of contract law is, and should be, to secure optimal commitment to
performing.6 This means that law should deter inefficient breach of
contracts. Accordingly, expectation damages maximize social welfare
because they allow breach when, and only when, performance is inefficient. Specific performance is also an efficient remedy, especially
when renegotiation costs are low.7 The gist of the economic analysis is
that the price of a contract is not an independent variable for legal
analysis, but rather depends on background legal rules. If contract law
compelled performance regardless of the cost to the seller (and renegotiation were too costly), the contract price would be higher than
under expectation damages, and the surplus for both parties lower.
The theory of efficient breach sees nothing wrong in breach per se. It
solely focuses on the costs and benefits ensuing for both parties.
In the late fifties it became evident that utilitarianism, by exalting
aggregate welfare and diluting ideas of right and wrong, was ill suited
to give theoretical expression to the movement of civil liberties.
Moral and political philosophers started to react against utilitarianism
by elaborating on ideas borrowed from contractarian and natural
rights theories that were prevalent in Western philosophy before the
rise of utilitarianism. John Rawls's A Theory of Justice,8 which espouses a theory of distributive justice grounded on Kantian moral
philosophy-although not on Kantian legal theory-was a major
turning point in this shift toward contractarian and rights-based moral
philosophy.
A few years later, the evolution of legal theory paralleled that of
political philosophy. The economic approach to law began to produce
explanations of a great diversity of legal fields. Such explanations
competed with traditional understandings in common law and, fundamentally, with the well ingrained notion that the point of law is to
6. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 189 (3d ed. 2000).

7. See Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance,89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979).
8. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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realize justice. In its early formulations the economic paradigm of law
was inclined to see law as enabling the working of free nmarkets or
solving its dysfunctions. Moral and legal philosophers would soon
challenge this paradigm because of its insensitivity to the role of justice and fairness in law. The challenge was greatly facilitated by the
evidence of anomalies in the economic explanation of common law.
So, in the seventies and eighties, a number of North American legal
philosophers led a process similar to that championed by Rawls in
political philosophy. Just as Rawls's theorizing was motivated by the
goal of laying Kantian, non-aggregative bases for a polity capable of
blending civil libertarianism and the welfare state, the reaction
against law and economics arose from a hostility to utilitarianism and
unfettered free markets.
At present a large group of Anglo-American legal philosophers
are embarked on the project of interpreting common law in accordance with moral ideas like fairness and autonomy. They take their
cue from Kant and other rationalist natural law philosophers, and
oppose the view of common law institutions as instruments to achieve
aggregate welfare. The justice-based theories that have emerged from
this theoretical project compete with law and economics, just as
rights-based theories compete with utilitarianism in political philosophy. While legal philosophers in common law jurisdictions are engaged in a thorough analysis of legal rules in various fields, their
counterparts in civil law countries often complain that jurists ignore
philosophical contributions that could give legal doctrines greater
clarity and precision. Although this is true, it is undeniable too that,
beyond clarity and precision, positivistic legal philosophy has not
much to offer to the doctrinal scholar. In general, positivism is concerned with the most abstract legal notions, like "validity" or "legal
system," rather than with specific legal issues. To be sure, the appropriate handling of those concepts can dissolve many confusions and
misunderstandings that crop up in legal studies. But the traditional
legal philosopher cannot say much about concrete questions in tort
law or contract law, for example. Legal philosophers in common law
jurisdictions address specific issues and seek to provide accounts that
rival in sophistication with those defended by their economic competitors. I will illustrate this new approach by referring, again, to tort
law and contract law.
In a pioneering essay published in the early seventies, Professor
George Fletcher uncovered the existence of two paradigms of liability

CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 79:521

in tort law: the "paradigm of reciprocity" and the "paradigm of reasonableness." 9 While the latter is oriented toward the community's
welfare, the former presupposes a distinctive idea of fairness: "all
individuals in society have the right to roughly the same degree of
security from risk." 10 According to Fletcher, tort liability-in either
the strict liability or the negligence variety--expresses the ideal of
corrective justice in recognizing the victim's right to recover for injuries resulting from nonreciprocal risks. Though Fletcher thinks that
both paradigms are pervasive in tort law, he sets store by the paradigm of reciprocity. In effect, he contends that, since the paradigm of
welfare is committed to the maximization of social utility, it fails to
respect the value of individual autonomy. Jules Coleman, Stephen
Perry, Ernest Weinrib, and Richard Wright, among others, have fol11
lowed Fletcher in adopting a corrective justice reading of tort law.
Looking for the point of tort law practice as it really is, these philosophers defend a theory of tort law that is broadly inspired in Aristotle
and Kant and that seeks to achieve greater explanatory power than
the economic analysis of tort law. Specifically, they maintain that the
economic approach leaves aside central moral aspects of tort law,
such as the pattern of interaction in which the harm occurred or the
kind of control which the defendant had over the harmful outcome.
For instance, Wright argues that common law attaches lesser importance to the defendant's utility than to the plaintiff's one, which seems
to contradict the assumptions of the economic approach. According
to the corrective justice view, tort law is best explained by assuming
that it embodies a non-consequentialist moral principle. In Coleman's
formulation, this principle holds that (i) a person is liable for any loss
she wrongfully inflicts to another, and (ii) if a person is liable for another's loss, she must fully compensate her. Coleman claims that corrective justice articulates abstract principles of fairness governing the
allocation of life's misfortunes.

9. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 537
(1972).
10. Id. at 550.
11. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); JULES L. COLEMAN, THE
PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY
(2001); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995); Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72

(Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001); Richard W. Wright, Right, Justice and Tort Law, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 159 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Richard W.
Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT
LAW, supra at 249.
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The second example is the philosophical account of contract law.
According to Professor Charles Fried, a contract is an exchange of
promises and, therefore, the breach of a contract is akin to the breach
of a promise.12 Fried grounds the moral obligation to keep one's
promises on the fact that breaking a promise violates the autonomy of
the promisee by abusing the trust one has generated by promising.
Other legal theorists, like Randy Barnett, Peter Benson, and Alan
Brudner, regard contractual obligation as a proprietary obligation,
rather than as a promissory one. 13 In making a contract, they claim,
one consents to the transfer of one's property, defined either as a
material thing or an economic value. On this view, contract law respects the plaintiff's proprietary rights arising out of a contract. Neither the promissory nor the proprietary account appeal to welfare
maximization to explain contractual obligation.
II. ARE THE TWO PARADIGMS APPLICABLE TO CIVIL LAW?
As I said at the outset of this Article, I want to discuss whether
the two paradigms are applicable to civil law. If civil law scholars introduced those paradigms into their inquiries, the nature of legal science could change again, as it changed after the emergence of the
school of natural law. Even so, we cannot expect an automatic alignment of civilian scholarship with common law scholarship, particularly in private law. On account of the quite different historical
evolution of common law and civil law, the relative explanatory value
of the philosophical and the economic paradigms is different in each
system of law. I will content myself with illustrating, through two examples, how civilian and common law institutions can be explained in
terms of different theoretical paradigms.
I will commence with the philosophical paradigm, where the answer is easier. In historic terms, the philosophical paradigm originated
as a way of understanding civil law. Let us be reminded that the philosophical approach to law nurtures itself from the rationalistic natural law theories that arose during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Furthermore, Grotius, Pufendorf, and Kant constructed
12. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION (1981).
13. See ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW: STUDIES IN HEGELIAN
JURISPRUDENCE ch.3 (1995); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 269 (1986); Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT
LAW: NEW ESSAYS 118 (Peter Benson ed., 2001).
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their systems of natural law with a view to systematizing the fundamental principles of the Corpus Iuris Civilis. As is well known, Roman Law was studied in continental Europe since the end of the
eleventh century. By contrast, Professor Coing observes that English
common law developed independently from Roman Canon Law.14
Rationalistic natural law philosophy not only provided abstract foundations for fundamental Roman Law institutions, like possession,
ownership, and contract, but also introduced the ideal of codification
and, by doing so, transformed Roman Law into a formal system based
on natural reason. On its influence on European legal science, Franz
Wiacker remarks:
After Hobbes and Pufendorf,... logical proof within a coherent
system became the Law of Reason's very touchstone of the soundness of its methodical axioms. In the eighteenth century it started to
put order into accounts of positive law, and thereby created the system which still dominates the statute-books and textbooks of the
European continent. 15
One cannot understand German legal science, for example,
without taking into consideration the influence of rationalist natural
lawyers like Pufendorf and Kant. In fact, the most abstract part of
Savigny's legal theorizing can be regarded as a philosophical theory of
civil law. Though all this fascinating intellectual process was overshadowed by codification, there is no doubt that the philosophical
paradigm can be brought to bear on the explanation of civil law. In
fact, the philosophical paradigm is inspired in the rationalistic natural
law school, which was historically associated with civil law. Paradoxically, the body of literature that North American legal philosophers
are now producing provides an account of common law, a system historically unrelated to that intellectual tradition. One should expect
that the philosophical paradigm has a more direct application to the
understanding of civil law. I will argue that this is indeed the case.
My first example is remedies for breach of contract. Following
classic Roman Law, common law instituted expectation damages as
the primary remedy for breach of contract. Courts can only order
specific performance under special circumstances; for instance, under
the irreparable injury rule, they would apply specific performance
14. See Helmut Coing, The Roman Law as lus Commune on the Continent, 89 L. Q. REV.
505 (1973). I take this to be consistent with the traditional intellectual influence of Roman Law
on English judges.
15. FRANZ WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE 218 (Tony Weir trans.,
1995).
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16
only in the special circumstances in which damages are inadequate.
In contrast, in civil law the primary remedy for breach of contract is
specific performance, rather than money damages. For example, Article 1134 of the French Civil Code declares that contracts must be
performed in good faith, and Article 1136 stipulates that an obligation
to give implies an obligation to deliver the thing and to preserve it
until delivery.17 Similarly the Argentine Code stipulates in Article 505
that the creditor, in case of nonperformance of a contract, has the
right to choose among the following measures: to force performance
of the obligation, to obtain performance by a third party at the
debtor's expense, or to obtain appropriate damages.' 8
The authors of a well-known casebook on Comparative Law
write: "The principle that obligations, especially contractual obligations, as a rule can be specifically enforced, and that ordinarily it is for
the obligee and not for the court to choose between specific performance and a non-specific remedy, has been adopted in the overwhelming majority of civil-law systems."' 9 However, this is only true of
obligations to give. Civil law systems adopt different modalities with
respect to obligations to do. The soft position is followed by the
French Civil Code, which provides in Article 1142 that an obligation
to do becomes an obligation to pay damages in case of nonperformance.20 The Argentine Civil Code follows Marcad6's interpretation of
the French code. Thus, Article 629 lays down that the creditor can
obtain forced performance of an obligation to do, except when this
requires exerting violence on the debtor. 2' The German Civil Code
(BGB) adopts the hard position. In Article 241 it states that "[t]he
effect of an obligation is that the creditor is entitled to claim performance from the debtor. 2 2 Moreover, the German Code of Civil Procedure empowers courts to apply fines and imprisonment to compel the

16. However, Professor Laycock has shown that courts usually find that compensatory
money damages are inadequate and, therefore, award specific performance. See DOUGLAS
LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1991). I am grateful to Tom
Ulen for calling my attention to Laycock's findings.
17. CODE CIVIL [C. cIv.] art. 1134, 1136 (Fr.).
18. CODIGO CIVIL [COD. CIV.] art. 505 (Arg.).
19. RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 665 (5th ed. 1988).
20. C. CIV. art. 1142.
21. COD. CIV. art. 629.
22. § 241 BGB (Ger.) (translated in THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE (Simon L. Goren trans.,
Rev. ed. 1994)).
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performance of an obligation to do when the act cannot be performed
23
by a third party.
The above difference indicates that civilian contract law and Anglo-American contract law are amenable to different sorts of explanation. Indeed, civilian contract law was influenced by the school of
natural law and its emphasis on individual autonomy, while contractual remedies in common law rather echo the practicality of Roman
Law. Under the influence of natural lawyers, the law of contracts in
civil law was shaped around the value of individual autonomy, which
makes it recalcitrant to welfare maximization accounts. As Professor
Catherine Valcke observes, "[t]he three foundational principles of
civilian contract law-freedom of contract, binding force of contract,
and consensualism-were directly derived from Kant's postulate of
'24
the autonomous will.
There are two arguments that support my suggestion. First, I
have said that expectation damages are an efficient remedy for breach
of contract. On the contrary, specific performance can only be vindicated as an efficient remedy under special conditions (e.g., high renegotiation costs).25 Since expectation damages are the primary remedy
in common law, the economic paradigm provides a successful explanation of this feature of common law. On the other hand, the theory
of contractual obligation as promissory obligation can nicely explain
why specific performance is the fundamental remedy in civil law. In
fact, the general provision of specific performance is a natural corollary of the idea that contracts are valid as an exercise of individual
autonomy. This idea has exerted decisive influence on the development of civilian contract law. If the binding force of contracts depends
on an act of the will, damages (both under the expectation and the
reliance standards) could at most be a second best remedy.
Interestingly, economic lawyers come to a similar conclusion.
Thus, Professors Kaplow and Shavell have argued that the explanation of contract law based on the duty to keep promises distorts
common law, because it implies the adoption of specific performance

23. § 888 ZPO (Zivilprozessordnung).
24. Catherine Valcke, The Unhappy Marriageof Corrective and DistributiveJustice in the
New Civil Code of Quebec, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 539, 567 (1996).
25. However, Professor Ulen argues that specific performance is more efficient than expectation damages because it avoids the need to estimate subjective values. See Thomas S.Ulen,
The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83
MICH. L. REV. 341 (1984).
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26
as primary remedy for breach of contract. Well, when it comes to
civil law, the result reverses. It is really the economic explanation that
distorts civil law, because civil law does not allow breaking a contract
and paying monetary damages, except when the obligee opts for the
latter remedy or, under the French system, when the contract embodies an obligation to do so. The idea of an efficient breach (in particular, of an obligation to give) is completely alien to civilian contract
law. It is not economics, but rather moral philosophy that has the initial appeal to account for this aspect of civil law. This lends support to
my contention that moral philosophy is in a better position to explain
civilian contract law than the economic paradigm. At the same time,
the latter paradigm seems to work well in common law.
Second, one possible explanation of the shift from damages to
specific performance sees it as related to the view that natural law
philosophers adopted with respect to the transfer of ownership and
risk in sale. In Roman Law, as a rule, risk of damage or destruction
passed to the buyer at the moment of agreement, but ownership only
passed to the buyer with physical delivery. As Professor Alan Watson
points out, Grotius, Pufendorf, and Barbeyrac thought that it was
irrational to locate at different times the transfer of ownership and
that of risk. Whereas Grotius and Barbeyrac defended the proposition that both ownership and risk must pass together to the buyer at
the moment of agreement, Pufendorf affirmed that the transference
should occur at the moment of delivery. Under the influence of Barbeyrac, the French Civil Code changed the Roman rule and provided
that both ownership and risk get transferred to the buyer at the moment of agreement.27 On the contrary, the Argentine Civil Code and
the BGB followed Pufendorf's position and stated that risk and ownership pass together to the buyer, but at the moment of physical delivery.
Confronted with these enigmatic differences, the economic
analysis of law seems unhelpful. From an economic viewpoint, it is
efficient to make an avoidable loss fall on the party who can at the
cheapest cost reduce its risk and, therefore, get insured against it. But
the kind of loss at hand is, by hypothesis, beyond the debtor's control.
So one could suggest that the differences are almost accidental. Defending this interpretation, Watson writes: "the French rejection of

26. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 1.
27. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW
ch.14 (1993).
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the Roman rules on this point was not the result of social development, nor due to inherent practical weaknesses of the older system
nor the consequence of an awareness of the logical necessity of their
own preferred view."28 Yet he fails to offer a theoretical explanation
of accidental rules. One could suggest that many legal rules lack a
specific rationale. Just as language rules, they are useful devices to
coordinate individual action.2 9 On this view, it does not matter when
the transfer of risk and ownership takes place; it only matters that we
all agree on one single rule. Perhaps Savigny had the idea of coordination in mind when he drew his well-known analogy between law
and language.30
One could also try a philosophical explanation. This explanation
would be simple and plausible in French civil law. Let us be reminded
that in the French Code ownership passes to the buyer at the moment
of consent. This rule fits well the provision of specific performance as
the primary remedy for breach of obligations to give. If the proprietary title passes to the buyer when the agreement is made, the buyer
should obviously have the option to require delivery of his property.
My point is not that the French drafters changed the Roman system
of transfer of ownership by locating it at the moment of agreement
because French law had already substituted specific performance for
money damages as the primary remedy for breach of contract. Nor do
I mean that the proprietary theory is the best philosophical account of
civil law's preference for specific performance. Rather, I submit that
both changes can be explained on the basis of the autonomy-based
conception of contracts endorsed by the school of natural law. At
those points where moral philosophy influenced civil law, law and
economics is unhelpful, and the philosopher carries the day.
My second illustration is civil liability. Most civil codes establish
negligence as the fundamental paradigm of civil liability. In civil law,
negligence requires causation and fault. Thus, Article 1382 of the
French Code reads: "Any act whatever of man which causes damage
to another obliges him by whose fault it occurred to make reparation."'" The same text has been reproduced in Article 2315, paragraph
28. Id. at 85.
29. See RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY ch.3
(1999).
30. See FREDERICK CHARLES VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR
LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE (Abraham Hayward trans., photo. reprint 1977).
31. C. CIV. art. 1382 (translated in THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE (John H. Crabb trans., rev.

ed., 1995)).
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A, of the Civil Code of Louisiana,3 2 and.inspired Article 1109 of the
Argentine Civil Code. 33 Since the traditional theory of civil liability in
civil law requires fault, it is congenial to the idea of corrective justice.
As Professor Francesco Parisi has shown, the central position of
the fault principle in civil law is the result of a long historical process
that started with Aristotelian ethics and its influence on the three
fundamental Roman law principles: honeste vivere, suum cuique
tribuere, and alterum non laedere. Particularly, the latter cannon provided the philosophical basis for the fact-based system of civil liability
in the classical period. The Lex Aquilia introduced the requirement of
iniuria,but lacked a general principle of civil liability. Thomas Aquinas and the humanist jurist Hugo Donellus contributed to the gradual
emergence of a fault-based system of civil liability in continental
Europe. Finally, the rationalistic natural law ideas of Hugo Grotius
had a great intellectual impact on Jean Domat and Robert Pothier,
whose works where the main sources for the drafting of the French
Civil Code. 34
The articulation of the fault principle in European civil law is the
result of centuries of interaction between ethical and juridical ideas.
The basic assumption is that no one can be held liable for outcomes
that are not attributable to her voluntary choices. The idea of corrective justice requires neutralizing the impact of chance or bad luck on
legal liability. As a corollary of the ideal of corrective justice, the fault
principle is deeply embedded in civil law. Because of the close historical links between natural law and civil law, philosophical accounts of
tort law are more suitable for understanding the civilian system.
With the uprising of technical innovations and industrial production, and their accompanying risks for persons and property, the notion of fault would fade away in the civilian regime of liability. In fact,
civil law started to relax the monolithic theory of civil liability by accepting nonfault solutions to improve the legal position of neighbors,
pedestrians, consumers, and factory workers. Thus, French jurists and
courts proposed the theory of risk to attenuate the principle of fault
stated in Article 1382 of the Civil Code through an expansive con-

32. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2315(A) (1997 & 2004 Supp.).
33. COD. CiV. art. 1109.
34. See James Gordley, Tort Law in the Aristotelian Tradition, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 11, at 131; Francesco Parisi, Alterum Non Laedere:
An Intellectual History of Civil Liability,39 AM. J. JURIS. 317 (1994).
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struction of Article 1384, first paragraph, which establishes civil liability for the act of the things that a person has in his custody. 35
It is not indisputable how to understand the relaxation of the
fault principle in civil law. On the one hand, the economic paradigm
can provide an elegant explanation of strict liability in terms of the
economic principle of optimal deterrence. On the other hand, the
philosophical paradigm could try to explain the shift toward strict
liability in terms of corrective justice. As said above, George Fletcher
has proposed an explanation of strict liability as implementing the
victim's right to recovery from nonreciprocal injuries.6 Fletcher's
proposal suggests that it is an open question whether strict liability
requires an economic, non-philosophical explanation. What is certain,
however, is that the classical conception of civil liability in civil law
can be easily explained in terms of corrective justice.
Philosophical fault-based accounts of tort law have multiplied in
the last years. Paradoxically, those accounts are brought to bear on
common law, in which the principle of fault never acquired the dominant position it traditionally had in civil law. In fact, in old common
law cases, like Weaver v. Ward37 and Dickenson v. Watson,38 liability
was regarded as arising from trespass and fault was not required. It
was the interference with rights over one's own body or external
things that was constitutive of the misconduct. Fault only appeared as
a requirement of civil liability in the late Middle Ages, with the writ
of trespass on the case. According to the orthodox historical view, a
comprehensive system of fault-based liability only appeared in
American law toward the middle of the nineteenth century as a way
of subsidizing new industrial enterprises."9 Harvey v. Dunlop,1° in
1843, and Brown v. Kendall,41 in 1850, introduced the general requirement of negligence for civil liability. The Chief Judge of the New
York court deciding the former case declared: "No case or principle
can be found, or if found can be maintained, subjecting an individual
35. C. cIv. art. 1384. See 1 HENRI MAZEAUD & LEON MAZEAUD, TRArt THEORIQUE ET
PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILITI CIVILE DtLICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE 81-88 (4th ed.
1947).
36. See Fletcher, supra note 9.
37. 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (1616).
38. 84 Eng. Rep. 1218 (1682).
39. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 409-10 (1973);
MORTON J. HORwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 85-99

(1977).
40. 1843 Hill & Den. 193, 194-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
41. 60 Mass. 292, 296 (1850).
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to liability for an act done without fault on his part. ' 42 Incredibly,
American courts "discovered" this principle at least two centuries
later than European law. Even after Harvey v. Dunlop, the prevalence of the fault principle was not beyond doubt. For instance, in
Hay v. Cohoes,43 a blasting case decided in 1849, the same New York
court applied the old principle sic utere tuo, a trespassory doctrine
that only requires invasion of land and causation of damage for civil
liability. Moreover, in nineteenth century English law, negligence did
not become a fundamental principle, as shown in the decision of the
Court of Exchequer in Fletcher v. Rylands,44 an escaping water case of
1865. Most clearly, Lord Bramwell held that the damages action was
maintainable "on the plain ground that the defendants have caused
water to flow into the plaintiff's mines, which, but for the defendants'
act, would not have gone there. '45 He added that "the defendants'
innocence, whatever may be its moral bearing on the case, is immate46
rial in point of law."
It may be questioned whether strict liability was the traditional
regime in common law before the rise of negligence. Professor
Robert Rabin claims, for instance, that liability based on a fault principle prevailed "against a contrapuntal theme of no-liability, not strict
liability. '47 Rabin's idea is that industrial damages cases were unprecedented in classic common law, and that American courts tended
to resolve them from a start in fault terms. Thus, he quotes Losee v.
Clute48 and Losee v. Buchanan,49 two steam boiler cases decided in
1873, where the court rejected the strict liability doctrine of Rylands
and established that fault must be shown for the defendant to be held
responsible for unintended injury. Along similar lines, Professor Gary
Schwartz rebuts the subsidy interpretation of the supposed shift from
strict liability to negligence by analyzing nineteenth century tort law
as it developed in California and New Hampshire. 0 Schwartz shows
42. Harvey, 1843 Hill & Den. at 194; see also Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to
Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 368 (1951).
43. 2 N.Y. 159, 161 (1849).
44. 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865).
45. Id. at 744.
46. Id.
47. Robert L. Rabin, The HistoricalDevelopment of the Fault Principle:A Reinterpretation,
15 GA. L. REV. 925, 938 (1981).
48. 51 N.Y. 494 (1873).
49. 51 N.Y. 476 (1873).
50. Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A
Reinterpretation,90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981).
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convincingly that compensation for personal injuries was often decided in negligence terms during the first half of the nineteenth century, and that strict liability was mostly confined to nuisance cases. In
fields like transportation and textile factories, California and New
Hampshire courts tended to favor the position of plaintiffs by means
of the doctrine res ipsa loquitur and the denial of contributory negligence, and rejected pro-development arguments for justifying the
assumption of industrial risks.
Leaving aside the controversies about the background against
which the principle of fault acquired a decisive role in nineteenth century American law, there is little doubt that the traditional paradigm
of liability in common law stresses invasion of property rights and
direct or indirect harm resulting thereof, whereas the basic paradigm
in civil law is grounded on a moralized idea of fault. Despite this historical contrast between common law and civil law, legal philosophers
in civil law jurisdictions usually ignore the kind of philosophical
analyses that their colleagues in common law jurisdictions have been
recently cultivating. Since the philosophical paradigm is largely a reaction to law and economics, the lack of interest might be due to the
difficult and slow reception of law and economics in civil law countries. " I suggest that we could explain this phenomenon by taking into
consideration one fundamental feature of civil law. In civil law, judicial decisions are grounded on formal reasons, that is, rules defined
by its formal attributes, rather than on moral, economic, political,
institutional, or other social considerations. Whereas the American
judge, for example, is often expected to use policy-based reasoning to
interpret precedents and to establish new rules, the civilian judge is
bound to apply the civil code or the formal system of legal science
that mixes itself with the code. Legal science is more formal than
common law scholarship. Civil law reasoning typically starts from
abstract premises and concepts and, therefore, gives little room to the
kind of consequentialist, forward-looking reasoning on which law and
economics relies. Economic considerations are not completely absent
from legal science, but their role is a restricted one. When formal reasoning does not yield a definite answer to a legal question, the legal
scientist usually resorts to the fiction of the rational legislator.5 2 This
51. See R. Cooter and J. Gordley, Economic Analysis in Civil Law Countries: Past, Present,
Future, 11 INT'L. REV. L. & ECON. 261 (1991). See also the other articles published in this issue.
52. See CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, CONSIDERACIONES SOBRE LA DOGMATICA JURiDICA

(1974); Leszek Nowak, A Concept of Rational Legislator,in POLISH CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
THEORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 137 (Zygmunt Ziembifiski ed., 1987).

2004]

FAIRNESS AND WELFARE

means that in legal science, consequentialist, economic reasoning is
limited to hard cases.
English law also has a formal system of legal sources, for precedents are formal reasons. Professors Patrick Atiyah and Robert
Summers have thoroughly shown that the American and the British
doctrines of the sources of law are very different in terms of formality.53 In effect, stare decisis is a more rigid doctrine in British law, leaving little leeway to explicit policy analysis. It is American common
law, rather than British law, that can be contrasted with civil law in
terms of formality. In a similar vein, Professor Richard Posner has
recently argued that British common law and European civil law are
comparable in terms of formality. Both British and European judges
train themselves in bureaucratic careers that accept as axiomatic the
functional separation between the legislature and the judiciary. It is
only in the United States where judges feel free to systematically employ consequentialist, instrumental reasoning. 54 This could explain
why law and economics is more easily accepted in American legal
circles than in British and European ones.
I have tried to explain why law and economics does not have an
easy way into civil law. This is not to say that economic analysis is
irrelevant to explain civil law. I have already indicated that the trend
toward non-fault liability in civil law could be explained in terms of
optimal deterrence. Furthermore, policy analysis manifests itself in
times of codification or code amendment. I will provide two examples
to show the importance of economic analysis for civilian legislation.
My first example is the drafting of the German Civil Code (BGB).
Professor Jirgen Backhaus claims that "[t]he [German] Civil Code
was, in its ultimate form, passed with the explicit input of the leading
economists of their time in Germany, and based on explicit economic
reasoning."55 He reports that a group of economists, in particular Otto
von Gierke, published articles in the Jahrbuch fur Gesetzgebung,
Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich criticizing the
first civil code drafts of 1887 and 1889. The economists' critique led to
the creation of a second committee in 1890, which issued a completely
revised draft in 1895. Though Backhaus contends that the new draft,
53. See P. S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLOAMERICAN LAW (1987).
54. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA
(1996).
55. Jurgen G. Backhaus, Otto von Gierke (1841-1921), in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO
LAW AND ECONOMICS 313, 314 (Jirgen G. Backhaus ed., 1999).
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finally passed in 1896, accorded better with the needs of a developed
industrial market economy, he does not specify the revisions that allegedly produced such outcome.
My second example provides greater factual information. As is
well known, all civil codes regulate real rights. Interestingly, the
draftsman of the Argentine Civil Code, Dalmacio Velez Sarsfield,
introduced in the code various rules that limit an individual's capacity
to break up property bundles too much. Particularly, Article 2502
prohibits the creation of new types of real rights (numerus clausus).56
In the footnote, Velez Sarsfield mentions the hindrances to economic
exploitation posed by the decomposition of property in medieval
Europe, particularly in Spain.57 He justifies the provision by saying,
"The multiplicity of real rights over the same goods is a fertile source
of complications and conflicts, and can much damage the exploitation
of those goods as well as the free circulation of real estate, perpetually embarrassed. 5 8 Moreover, in the footnote to Article 2503 he justifies the suppression of emphyteusis and of the surface right, which
he expressly prohibits in Article 2614, along with all kinds of prohibitions on alienation. 9 The provisions of the Argentine Civil Code that
guarantee the unity of ownership by preventing its voluntary disintegration have a clear economic foundation, recently systematized by
Professor Michael Heller. 60 He studies how economic activities are
affected by the decomposition of ownership rights into the hands of
various holders. In advancing complete, united private ownership,
Velez Sarsfield tried to avoid inefficiencies associated with the socalled "tragedy of the anti-commons," which occur when transaction
costs, strategic behavior, or cognitive deficiencies prevent the holders
of different property rights from coalescing back into a single bundle
of rights. To be sure, Velez Sarsfield did not handle this modern notion, but he had a fine intuitive understanding of the underlying economic rationale of non-fragmented property. As we now know, the
anti-commons tragedy threatens the effective use and disposal of
property.
The role of policy analysis in times of legal change suggests that
the civil code has economic foundations too. Bringing to light those
56. COD. Civ. art. 2502.
57. Id.
58. Id. (author's translation).
59. COD. Civ. art. 2503, 2614.
60. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
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policy decisions might be a way of explaining abstract and formal
notions. This possibility cannot be discarded beforehand. In fact, the
that civil lawyers
increasing economic literature on civil law suggests
61
analysis.
economic
from
learn
to
have much
CONCLUSION

Both the philosophical and the economic paradigm may be helpful for understanding law, in either its civilian or common law variety.
I have argued, though, that the relative importance of such paradigms
is different in common law and civil law. Fairness and autonomy are
more important values in civil law, given the philosophical roots of
civil codes and civilian legal science. However, law and economics
may be helpful to understand those fields of civil law that have been
moving away from their classical individualistic structure toward collectivistic modes of welfare maximization.

61.

See, e.g., 2 CIVIL LAW AND ECONOMICS,

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). For an economic analysis of the phenomenon of codification itself, see Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, The Making of the
French Civil Code: An Economic Interpretation,14 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 193 (2002).
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